Abstract-PVSS stands for publicly verifiable secret sharing. In PVSS, a dealer shares a secret among multiple share holders. He encrypts the shares using the shareholders' encryption algorithms and publicly proves that the encrypted shares are valid. Most of the existing PVSS schemes do not employ an ElGamal encryption to encrypt the shares. Instead, they usually employ other encryption algorithms like a RSA encryption and Paillier encryption. Those encryption algorithms do not support the shareholders' encryption algorithms to employ the same decryption modulus. As a result, PVSS based on those encryption algorithms must employ additional range proofs to guarantee the validity of the shares obtained by the shareholders. Although the shareholders can employ ElGamal encryptions with the same decryption modulus in PVSS such that the range proof can be avoided, there are only two PVSS schemes based on ElGamal encryption. Moreover, the two schemes have their drawbacks. One of them employs a costly repeating-proof mechanism, which needs to repeat the dealer's proof at least scores of times to achieve satisfactory soundness. The other requires that the dealer must know the discrete logarithm of the secret to share and thus weakens the generality and it cannot be employed in many applications. A new PVSS scheme based on an ElGamal encryption is proposed in this paper. It employs the same decryption modulus for all the shareholders' ElGamal encryption algorithms, so it does not need any range proof. Moreover, it is a general PVSS technique without any special limitation. Finally, an encryption-improving technique is proposed to achieve very high efficiency in the new PVSS scheme. It only needs a number of exponentiations in large cyclic groups that are linear in the number of the shareholders, while all the existing PVSS schemes need at least a number of exponentiations in large cyclic groups that are linear in the square of the number of the shareholders
INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is a technique to share a secret among some shareholders and allow certain subsets of them to reconstruct the secret. It is needed in applications where no single entity is trusted and an important power or capability must be shared among multiple parties. The most popular secret sharing mechanism is the t -out-of-n threshold secret sharing [12] , where a dealer shares a secret s among n shareholders and allows any t of them to reconstruct it. shares can be used to reconstruct the secret using Lagrange Interpolation, while no information about the secret is obtained if the number of available shares is smaller than t . Secret sharing is widely employed in various secure protocols like e-auctions, e-voting, and multiparty computation. As most of the applications require public verifiability, very often secret sharing must be publicly verifiable. Namely, it must be publicly verified without revealing the secret or any of its shares where all of the n shares are consistently generated from a unique secret-generating polynomial such that any t of them reconstructs the same secret.
Publicly verifiable secret sharing is usually called PVSS. Famous PVSS schemes include [3, 8, 10, 13] , where one of the two PVSS protocols in [13] is a development of the proposal in [7] . The most recently published PVSS scheme seems to be [9] . PVSS is actually a combination of secret sharing and publicly verifiable encryption and usually works as follows: possible change of the shares when being decrypted is not a problem as the same modulus can be used in share generation and share reconstruction. With all the computations in the PVSS scheme employing the same modulus, changing any integer in any computation by adding or subtracting a multiple of the modulus does not affect the correctness of the computations. When the share holders' encryption algorithms employ different decryption moduli, shares overflowing the moduli is a serious problem in security as even if the dealer encrypts a share of the secret for a shareholder and successfully proves that the encrypted share can be used to reconstruct the secret correctly the shareholder may obtain an incorrect share.
Unfortunately, in the commonly used public key encryption algorithms, only ElGamal encryption supports its different instances to employ the same decryption modulus. The other algorithms like RSA encryption or Paillier encryption must employ different decryption moduli for different users, as their security depends on the hardness of the factorization problem, and so they must employ different composite moduli in encryption and thus use different decryption moduli. So if those encryption algorithms are employed in PVSS, every i s encrypted in i c must be proved by the dealer to be smaller than i p , otherwise the validity of the shares cannot be guaranteed. Namely, n instances of the so-called range proof (defined in [4] ) are needed in the PVSS schemes employing those encryption algorithms. Such PVSS schemes include [3, 8, 9] , which are inefficient.
The only PVSS schemes employing ElGamal encryption for the shareholders are [13] and [10] . Although they can employ the same decryption modulus for all the shareholders' encryption algorithms and are inherently immune to any problem caused by an overflow of the shares, they have their own drawbacks as explained in Section 2. Actually, all the existing PVSS schemes are either limited in application or inefficient in computation as explained in Section 2.
In this paper, a new PVSS scheme based on ElGamal encryption is proposed. It employs the same decryption modulus for all the shareholders' ElGamal encryption algorithms so that there is no worry about an overflow of the encrypted shares and no range proof is needed. Moreover, it is a general PVSS technique without any special limitation and so it can be employed in any application of PVSS. Finally, an encryption-improving technique is proposed to achieve very high efficiency in the new PVSS scheme. It only needs ) (n O exponentiations in large cyclic groups and is much more efficient than the existing PVSS schemes, which need at least ) (tn O exponentiations in large cyclic groups in computation where t usually has the same magnitude as n .
LIMITED APPLICATION AND INEFFICIENCY OF THE EXISTING PVSS SCHEMES
The existing PVSS schemes [3, [8] [9] [10] 13] are either limited in application or inefficient in computation or have both drawbacks. More precisely, the PVSS schemes in [10 and 9] and the two PVSS protocols in [3] with delayed recovery depend on special conditions and thus are not general PVSS schemes that are suitable for various applications, while the PVSS schemes in [3, 8, 13] are inefficient in computation.
In the PVSS scheme in [10] , a dealer employs a special sharing function to share a specially generated secret, while the other PVSS schemes employ the normal sharing function by Shamir [12] and can share any secret in general. Moreover, a corresponding special secret reconstruction function is employed in [10] to reconstruct the secret accordingly. The special sharing function reconstruction function in [10] is described as follows:
• Sharing , so actually the discrete logarithm of the secret s is shared using the share-generating polynomial. Its reconstruction function is accordingly changed to reconstruct s using the shares of δ . So knowledge of a discrete logarithm of the secret is compulsory to the dealer in the PVSS scheme in [10] . Therefore, it is not suitable for some applications. One of the most common applications of PVSS is key sharing (also known as distributed key generation in some cryptographic schemes). To the best of our knowledge, a secret key is usually chosen from a consecutive interval range in normal cryptographic schemes and no cryptographic scheme first chooses a discrete logarithm of the secret key and then calculates the secret key in a cyclic group. Actually, we do not know of any key generation algorithm that raises a generator of a cyclic group to the power of a chosen integer to generate a key in a cyclic group. Another important application of PVSS is the sharing of passwords or accessing codes in a distributed access control. In most applications, users usually randomly choose a password or access a code and very often the users would like to choose some special password or access a code like their birthdays or phone number. So it is very probable that a discrete logarithm of the password or access code is unknown or even does not exist at all.
If the dealer does not know the discrete logarithm of the secret in [10] , its PVSS scheme can only work like the two PVSS protocols with delayed recovery in [3] . However, PVSS with delayed recovery cannot distribute a secret to the shareholders in real time, as the shareholders in the PVSS system need to search for discrete logarithms in a large range to obtain their shares. So they are inefficient in secret reconstruction and are not suitable for many applications where share retrieval or secret reconstruction cannot be delayed. The PVSS scheme in [9] N is the multiplica-tive modulus used in the decryption function of i P 's encryption algorithm. Otherwise, reconstruction of the secret may go wrong due to an attack in the end of Section 4 in [9] . However, the range proofs in [9] can only work under a special condition. In Section 5 of [9] s is out of the range, it is changed when its encryption is decrypted and any secret reconstruction using it will fail. So security of the PVSS scheme in [9] depends on distribution of the shares and is not always satisfied.
It has been shown in [3, 8] that their general PVSS protocols can choose 3 as the RSA public keys of the shareholders to improve efficiency. However, too small of a RSA public key, like 3 or 5, is usually impractical in real-life cryptographic protocols and it is widely believed in the cryptographic community that smaller public keys make the RSA cipher more vulnerable to attacks, especially when a proper padding of the message is absent. A famous example is that in a broadcasting protocol an attack can be launched if multiple receivers use the same small public key e (e.g., 3) and employ different RSA moduli A more formal and detailed analysis of the vulnerability of very small RSA public keys is given in [6] , which shows that an RSA cipher with too small of a public key like 3 fails, "if the opponent knows two-thirds of the message, or if two messages agree over eight-ninths of their length; and we can find the factors of PQ N = if we are given the high order bits of P ."
Even those cryptographic schemes aiming at improving the efficiency of an RSA cipher like [2] agree that, "RSA as usually deployed uses a larger public exponent ( e = 65537)." So, in authoritative security standards like the NIST standard [1] , it is required that the public key of an RSA cipher must be no smaller than 65537. In PVSS, as publicly verifiable encryption is necessary, secure padding of a message is impossible (or at least very difficult). So the threat of an attack exploiting small RSA public keys is serious in PVSS and the public keys of the RSA cipher in PVSS should be more cautiously chosen. Therefore, in practical PVSS applications, not only should too small public keys, like 3 or 5, be avoided but also a more strict security standard should be followed and larger RSA public keys should be adopted. When the public keys of the shareholders The PVSS protocols in [13] repeat their proof of validity for every encrypted share scores of times to obtain practical soundness. When they are repeated K times, the validity of the shares can be guaranteed except for a probability K − 2 . To achieve satisfactory soundness, their computational cost ) (Ktn O is very high.
NEW PVSS BASED ON AN ELGAMAL ENCRYPTION
In our proposal the shareholders are denoted as This new PVSS scheme is a general solution and has no limit in secret generation, secret sharing, or secret reconstruction. So it is suitable for any application of PVSS. Especially, it does not require a discrete logarithm if the secret is chosen before it is generated, like in [10] , and thus can be employed in applications like distributed key generation and distributed access control. Moreover, it employs ElGamal encryption and thus a uniform decryption modulus for all the shareholders, so it avoids a complex range proof like that in [9] . The new PVSS protocol is more efficient than the PVSS schemes in [3, 8, 9, 13] . It does not employ any repetition mechanism (which is needed in [13] ) or inefficient share decryption (which is needed in the PVSS protocols with delayed secret recovery in [3] ). Its efficiency does not depend on the key size of the employed encryption algorithm (unlike the PVSS protocols in [3, 8] ) or an unguaranteed range proof (unlike the PVSS protocol in [9] ).
SECURITY ANALYSIS AND A SLIGHTLY MODIFIED SECRET RECONSTRUCTION
The correctness of the new PVSS protocol is proved in Theorem 1. Its soundness is proved in Theorem 2, which shows that the validity of the shares is guaranteed in a loose standard, allowing i s − to be received by i P . It is enough to guarantee the correct reconstruction of the secret as the slightly modified secret reconstruction function in Fig. 2 demonstrates. As for privacy, the proof protocol in the new PVSS protocol only publishes i s′ , i C , and i C′ besides the underlying zero knowledge proof primitives (including the zero knowledge proof of the knowledge of the discrete logarithm and the zero knowledge proof of the equality of discrete logarithms), which have been formally proved to be zero knowledge and reveal no secret information in [11] Figure 1 .
Proof: If the dealer is honest and strictly follows the new PVSS protocol, the following equations are satisfied: (4), (5) and (6) imply: (4), (5), (6) and (7) imply: 
COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION
Properties of the new PVSS scheme and the existing PVSS schemes are compared in Table 1 where K and ) log ( 2 i H e d have been defined in Section 2. Our comparison of computation focuses on the efficiency bottleneck in PVSS, public proof, and the verification of the validity of the encrypted shares. It also counts the number of exponentiations in large cyclic groups. The other operations like share generation, share encryption, share decryption by the share holders, secret reconstruction, and commitment to the share-generating polynomial are usually less costly and have a similar cost for different PVSS schemes, except that the two PVSS protocols with delayed recovery in [3] are inefficient in share decryption.
The comparison demonstrates the advantages of the new PVSS scheme proposed in this paper. It is a general PVSS solution without any limitations and is suitable for any application. It employs an ElGamal encryption so that all of the shareholders' encryption algorithms can employ the same decryption modulus to avoid range proofs. It is efficient as the first PVSS scheme to reduce the computational cost to ) (n O . 
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